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Fuelled by the success (and hype) around cryptocurrencies,
distributed ledger technologies (DLT), particularly blockchains,
have gained a lot of attention from awide spectrum of audi-
encewho perceive blockchains as a key to carry out business
processes that have hitherto been cumbersome in a cost and
time effectivemanner. Governments across the globe have
responded to this promising but nascent technology differ-
ently - from being apathetic or adopting await-and-watch
approach: letting the systems shape themselves, to creating
regulatory sandboxes and sponsoring capacity building, or
in some instances (arguably) over-regulating and attempt-
ing to put the blockchain genie back in the bottle. Possible
government role spans across a spectrum: regulating crypto-
currencies and initial coin offerings (ICO), formulating regu-
latory frameworks formanaging the adoptionof blockchains,
particularly in critical infrastructure industries, facilitating
capacity building, and finally, embracing blockchain technol-
ogy in conducting the activities of the government itself - be
it internally, or in using them to deliver public services. In
this paper we survey the last, namely, the use of blockchain
and associated distributed ledger technologies in the gov-
ernment technology (GovTech) stack, and discuss themerits
and concerns associated with the existing initiatives and
approaches.
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2 ANWITAMANDATTA
1 | INTRODUCTION
Since around the turn of the century, with the rise of Internet penetration (around the dot.com boom and bust), many
governments across the globe embraced the use of online services (Heeks (2001)), both as a channel for delivering
services to its customers, as well as for managing the backend and internal processes. From those early days of e-
government (e-gov), which theOECDdefines as ‘the use by the governments of information and communication technologies
(ICTs), and particularly the Internet, as a tool to achieve better government’ (OECD (2014)), over the next roughly two
decades, we have arrived at a juncture, where rise in digital literacy, near saturation of internet penetration in advanced
societies, particularly enabled by ubiquity of smartphones and mobile internet infrastructure, as well as advnaces
in big data management and analytics enabled artificial intelligence (AI) techologies, put us in a sweet spot, where
much more than the original objectives of e-government and e-governance (for instance, as outlined in OECD’s e-
government imperative document (Field et al. (2003))) can be achieved. TheOECD emphasizes this broader scope with
a distinct nomenclature ‘digital governance’, and defines it as the “use of digital technologies, as an integrated part of
governments’ modernisation strategies, to create public value. It relies on a digital government ecosystem comprised of
government actors, non-governmental organisations, businesses, citizens’ associations and individuals which supports
the production of and access to data, services and content through interactions with the government” (OECD (2014)).
While often the terms e-government/governance1 and digital government are also used interchangably, the distinct
OECD definitions help capture subtle yet fundamental changes that have emerged over time. Prominently, while the
coremission of catering to the public at large remains the same, themeans has expanded in its scope, and the emphasis
has shifted from the governments delivering it on their own to creating an environment, where it can be done using
public-private partnerships, as well as by facilitating purely privately funded efforts to flourish. This is being achieved by
creating an ecosystem comprising digital infrastructure and regulatory frameworks onwhich the diverse participants
can build upon.
For instance, many countries and cities have embarked on smart city initiatives in the last decade. The rise of app
based ride sharing and hailing services is an example instance of howprivate parties are addressing urban transportation
needs. Sharing economy in general, as a phenomenon (Heinrichs et al. (2013); Martin (2016)), for better or worse,
exemplifies this model further. In Figure 1 we show the Google topics search trend, (not to be treated as an irrefutable
evidence of the argument we have put forward, but more) as one plausible indicator. We notice that searches for the
topic ‘Smart city’ have increased over time. Furthermore, the in-set map indicates that this term dominates in many of
the digitally advanced countries which embraced e-government early on, and hence havemoved up the data value chain.
While the drive towards smart cities is just one amongmany aspects of digital government, it encapsulates the general
trend of moving up in the data value chain, that is evolving from the original digitization drive which was focussed on
creating an electronic channel for delivering citizen services andmanaging backend government workflows.
There are several intertwined and cascading factors at play in this evolution. What started as amove from paper
based workflows to digitization, led to creation of a huge volume of data that is readily available for automated
processing. The infrastructure to store and process humongous volume of data started tomature, even as the volume
of data being acquired also keeps rising by leaps and bounds. This data comes from a plethora of sources, and is very
diverse in nature - social media, sensors deployed for monitoring the environment, cities, buildings, financial records,
health records, to name just a few. Analysing this data yields intelligence, and creates opportunities, both for solving
(and identifying) problems, as well as the positive societal and financial impact such solutions yield.
1Thedistinct terms e-government and e-governance are sometimes used to distinguish the use of technology formanaging the government’s internal activities
versus service delivery to citizens. Nevertheless, for brevity, in this paper, wewill use the term e-goverment, and likewise, digital government, to capture both
meanings.
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F IGURE 1 Data from google trends for the topics of ‘E-government’ and ‘Smart city’ worldwide for the period from
January 2004 till April 2019were obtained (on 2ndMay 2019). The normalized relative frequencies are plotted here.
The relative dominance of the individual terms in each country is also depicted in the in-set map (with the color
corresponding the dominant term), obtained from the Google trends website https://trends.google.com/. For the
creation of themap, low search volume regions were included (grey regions indicate lack of adequate data still).
A common underlying theme in all this is the availability and sharing of (good quality of) data. However, there are
several challenges that hamper this, to name a few prominent ones: data integration and portability (Doan et al. (2012)),
privacy, distributed control, provenance and data usage transparency.
There are numerous privacy issues, and not all the issues are even well understood. This includes questions of
access control (who should get what data), information leak and side channels (even if a specific data in itself may not
prima facie reveal something, in conjunction with some other information, it may reveal something more than what
each of the individual pieces of information disclosed). Even within different government agencies, sharing certain
datamay be violative of the rights of a citizen as per the laws of the country. Sharing it with non-government entities
compound the concerns. Lack of (well thought of) regulations also lead tomany grey areas. Furthermore, individual
data aggregators need to satisfy the asscoiated privacy and security requirements, and theymay also want to control
the data they own in amanner where they can account for its usage.
For whichever reasons, the data in the systemmay be of poor quality, or outright wrong. Even otherwise, it would
be reasonable to expect certain accountability on the source of the information. Thus, data provenance and lineage,
along with ability to trace who all have accessed said data, and for which purposes, are also essential.
Technological solutions are thus needed to store, process, and share data in a securemanner, balancing the needs
(aspirational, as well as, often, regulatory) of utility and privacy in a highly distributed environment, involving many
autonomous entities, which may not (fully) trust each other. Blockchain technologies have emerged as a potential
candidate providing a framework to address several of these concerns. At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that,
blockchains (i) may not be the only way, or the best way, to solve the abovementioned problems, (ii) may not even be
solving all the problems enumerated here (let alone other issues not mentioned). Nevertheless, it is a candidate solution
that can naturally address issues such as distributed control among untrusted entities, and provides certain extent of
flexibilities, which is why they are being tried out in a plethora of application domains.
It is in this background, prompted both by need and potential but also hype, that several governments have started
pilot projects of using blockchains as part of the government technology stack.
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In the rest of this paper, we first briefly review distributed ledger and blockchain technologies in Section 2, then in
Section 3we report (in a non-exhaustive, but representative manner) on several government blockchain initiatives, and
finally in Section 4we draw our conclusions with a critique of these early efforts.
2 | BACKGROUND: BLOCKCHAINS
DLT versus blockchains
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, U.S. Department of Commerce) defines blockchains as
“tamper evident and tamper resistant digital ledgers implemented in a distributed fashion (i.e., without a central
repository) and usually without a central authority (i.e., a bank, company, or government)” (Yaga et al. (2018)). Thus, one
can characterize a blockchain with four salient properties: (i) immutability (append-only) data structure, (ii) replication
of the data across multiple participants, (iii) whether and how participation is restricted, and (iv) how the participants
establish an agreement (consensus) on how to add new data to the existing data.
This immutability property - where any changes to existing records can be detected (tamper evident), and it is
prohibitively costly if not impossible for one, or a minority of errant participants maintaining the distributed ledger
to introduce illegitimate changes (tamper resistant), make blockchains particularly appealing for a wide range of
applications and scenarios. Storing records of financial transactions is a natural such application, and blockchains have
been popularized by their usage foremost in Bitcoin, and subsequently by a plethora of other digital (crypto)currencies
which leverage on cryptography for both guaranteeing integrity of the records (as is achieved using hashing and chaining
to realize a blockchain), as well as for making it prohibitive to alter past records or insert arbitrary new records (e.g.,
Bitcoin uses cryptographic puzzles for proof-of-work to allow addition of new blocks in the blockchain) and for the
purpose of authentication and authorization (e.g., public key cryptography, specifically digital signatures are used in
Bitcoin to determine the legitimacy of specific Bitcoins being spent). Butmany other applications, particularly whenever
any form of audit is desirable, would benefit from such an immutable data structure. Even for applications, where
the information being stored is inherently mutable, for example, property or land ownership records, medical history
records, etc., the overlying application can leverage an immutable data-structure underneath to record the history of
changes, while using the latest version as the working data.
The replication of information across multiple sites is a necessity for enforcing the immutability and integrity of the
information stored in the blockchain, where, the replicated sites act as witnesses, so that unilateral changes to past
records or introduction of new records are not feasible, and instead the decisions aremade by establishing a consensus
on the shared state.
Since the state of the blockchain can be updated only through consensus among the multiple sites maintaining
it, the blockchain can also be used to establish trust among inherently untrusted entities. Users can establish a smart
contract using some programme logic (and data): for example, change the name against which a property is registered,
provided a certain amount of money is paid to the original owner of said property, and rely on the blockchain to carry
out the payment with tokenizedmoney and enforce the name change.
Finally, since the information stored in the blockchain is visible to every partipating replication site in the blockchain
(and whoever else have access to the date therein, more on this below), which is desirable for audit, it may appear
undesirable from theperspective of privacy or confidentiality of information. However, creativeworkaround to preserve
privacy and confidentialitymay be possible for awide range of applications, by storing a proxy information (tokenization)
which in itself does not reveal the content, but carries enough information for the specific purpose of the application.
For instance, if one wants to prove that a digitial document (e.g., educational certificate) was genuinely issued by certain
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organization, just a cryptographic hash summary of the digitally signed document may be stored in the blockchain.
When the original document is presented by the owner to any specific party scrutinizing the document, the scrutinizer
can validate that the document was indeed registeredwith the blockchain by the legitimate entity authorised to issue
said document, while, the presence of the said summary in the blockchain reveals no usable information in itself. Having
said that, the issue of information leak from data stored in blockchain, particularly when coupled with side information
that might be available to an adversary, is still not a thoroughly understood problem, and is a topic that would need
substantial further research.
2.1 | Permissionless, Permissioned and Private Blockchains
Blockchains can be broadly classified as being permissionless or permissioned. Permissionless blockchains are open for
anyone to replicate the blockchain data and participate in the (consensus) process to update the same.
Permissioned blockchains in contrast restrict those participating in themaintenance of the blockchain. This restric-
tionmight be imposed in a centralizedmanner or in a decentralizedmanner. One example of centralizedmembership
control would be that a government agency decides who all can participate. An example of decentralized member-
ship control could be that existing members of an alliance of organizations collectively decide to include or revoke
memberships.
Furthermore, in a permissioned blockchain, the data in the blockchain may be available (to be accessed/read)
exclusively to a certain set of entities/individuals - making it a private blockchain.
Blockchain is supposed to provide amechanism to derive trust The Economist (2015) among a group of entities
which do not inherently trust each other. In a permissionless blockchain, where there is no a priori trust among entities,
more expensivemechanisms (e.g., solving cyptographic puzzles as proof-of-workNakamoto et al. (2008)) are required in
order to mitigate malbehaving participants. In contrast, in permissioned or private blockchains, a certain degree of trust
among the participants is inherently (and implicitly) assumed, and as such, it allows flexibility in the extent of stringency
required to achieve consensus.
2.2 | Forks, Side-chains and Cross-chaining
Different members maintaning a blockchainmay try to add distinct new blocks simultaneously, which leads to what is
called forking. Such divergence is eventually reconciled through a consensusmechanism to arrive at a consistent shared
history. However, this provides an interesting opportunity, whereby, while the participants agree on the past history
that has been established, new/different rules can be imposed for defining what is a valid new block. If the new blocks
are still compatible and valid as per the older set of rules (backward compatible) its called a soft work, while, otherwise,
it is called a hard fork. Such forking also allows the original community of members mainaining a blockchain to split, and
create new communities, with a shared history up till a time point, and different ones from the point of forking.
It may be undesirable to put all information in the blockchain, either because it overloads the system, or because
of other concerns such as compatibility, or to carry out experimentations without interfering with the content of the
blockchain, or simply to keep certain information off themain chain. Such cases are accommodated by running parallel
ledger(s) maintained independently, which however cross-reference(s) the primary blockchain, andmay also use the
primary blockchain for recording certain (but not all the) states of such parallel ledgers, which are then called side-chains.
Finally, separate blockchains may want to interchange among themselves the stored data/information or the
associated digital assets, and this leads to the notion of a network of inter-operable but independent blockchains, i.e.,
cross-chaining Buterin (2016).
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3 | BLOCKCHAIN USE-CASES FOR DIGITAL GOVERNMENT
Notary and registry services: Themost natural application of a government service of blockchain is a notary service.
Drawing on this, registry for any real world assets can also be built using a blockchain. This is indeed one of the canonical
use cases of blockchain being piloted in many places Eder (2019); Castellanos and Benbunan-Fich (2018). Different
variations exist, government led or backed initiatives, as well as private entitiesmirroring the government’s land registry
record on a blockchain. In general, registry services of all sorts can be realized using blockchain, e.g., a registry of
companies SmartDubai.ae (2016); The Malta Independent (2019).
Digital identity: The European Union Blockchain Observatory & Forum (https://www.eublockchainforum.eu), an
European Commission initiative, identifies digital identity as a fundamental building block Lyons et al. (2018a) that
can be realized using a blockchain, to act as a digital equivalent of government issued identity documents. Such a
mechanism ideally needs to have flexibility, such that only relevant aspects of the digital identity are exposed, without
revealing other aspects of identity information not relevant for the given context, thus affording individuals a degree
of sovereignity in managing their identity. It is envisaged that such an identity service can be leveraged to provide a
wide range of other services. Some pilot cases that have tried identity services using blockchains include e-voting2
and bike rental3 tried in Zug, Switzerland; worker training certification and check-in/out at work sites carried out
by Swiss railways 4, debit cards for refugees without other documentations or bank account in Finland5. All the
three use cases from Switzerland that are mentioned here used a public blockchain based decentralized identity
service (https://www.uport.me), while the Finnish initiative was in liasion with a private enterprise, Moni. Estonia,
considered a pioneer in digital identity, uses a blockchain variant called KSI (Keyless Signature Infrastructure), created
by Guardtime e estonia.com (2008). The European Union regulation eIDAS (electronic IDentification, Authentication
and trust Services) mandates a digital identity system that interoperates across EU, however it somewhat predates
the recent hype around blockchain technologies, and it does not utilize blockchain as the core infrastructure to realize
it, but use of andwith blockchains is under deliberationServida andMunoz (2018). The ID2020 ID2020.org (2014) is
another public-private partnership, while Decentralized Identity Foundation DIF (2017) is an industry alliance, both
aimed at realizing blockchain enabled digital identity in a global scale. In the digital identity space, we thus see use of
both permissionless as well as permissioned/ private blockchains, led by government, public-private partnerships, as
well as private entities.
Digital certificates and records: The ideas of a registry service, along with identity, naturally extends to a repository of
certificates and records. These could be inherent attributes (intrinsic to the individual, for example: data of birth/death,
biometrics, health), attributes accumulated or created over time (health records, educational credentials, wealth and
associated property and financial records, will & testament), or assigned (e.g., government ID numbers, credit risk score).
These records furthermore can be grouped as per the frequency with which they changeMorris et al. (2018). Finally, a
third dimension relates to access rights and privacy/confidentiality requirements of these records, namely who have
the right to access which parts of said records, and who have right to update said records. The suitability of storing
the spectrum of such records over blockchain, meeting the access control, confidentiality, (system) access and change
logging, and content update dynamics require exploration. Blockchain use to curb degree fraud in countries as diverse
asMalaysia6 andMaltaPatel (2018) have been proposed. Hash based integrity check and logging is used for Estonia’s
2https://medium.com/bitrates-news/swiss-city-of-zug-successfully-completes-blockchain-based-e-voting-trial-b7b312e5cdc0
3https://medium.com/uport/zug-residents-can-now-ride-e-bikes-using-their-uport-powered-zug-digital-ids-7ed31ac9d621
4https://medium.com/linum-labs/swiss-federal-railway-trials-first-digital-identity-pilot-on-ethereum-4a3cb3c6621
5https://www.wired.com/story/refugees-but-on-the-blockchain/
6https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2018/11/429615/university-consortium-set-authenticate-degrees-using-blockchain
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electronic health records 7, andmany healthcare industry use cases from drug traceability 8 to insurance Deloitte are
expected to improve the quality of data, service and cost to deliver the same. Again, most of these are in exploratory
pilot stage at the moment, and ranges from government led efforts like the one from Estonia, to alliances of private
companies such as the Synaptic Health Alliance 9.
Sovereign/fiat currency: Given that blockchain’s popularity in the past decade originates from the success of cryptocur-
rencies, use of blockchain to support digital sovereign fiat currencies (aside themany private sector financial technology
innovation attempts) is natural. Sinagpore’s project UbinThe Monetary Authority of Singapore (2017), under stew-
ardship of theMonetary Authority of Singapore and in collaboration withmajor financial institutions (the Association
of Banks in Singapore (ABS)) carried out pilot studies of inter-bank transactions using digital ledger technologies, and
developed three models for decentralised inter-bank payment and settlements. While the Singapore project used
the blockchain technology solely as a distributed ledger for recording the transactions using tokenized coins, “Crypto
Franc” was proposed as a bond10, with its value pegged to the Swiss franc on a 1-to-1 basis, where permissioned nodes
federating Swiss Cantons were proposed to enforce the adherence to regulatory requirements, and tomaintain the
ledger. The status of this proposal is ambiguous at the time point this article is being written, and in general, there seems
no government level support or intent for a sovereign Swiss digital currency 11. A notable but dubious (because of the
political background) and apparently defunct attempt was Venezuela’s Oil andMineral backed Petro currency. Marshall
island, through Sovereign Currency Act of 2018 Republic of the Marshall Islands (2018), introduced a new blockchain
based currency called the Sovereign (‘SOV’), and ironically, plans to issue physical notes for the digital currency. A July
2018 article surveys the status of state issued digital currencies on its adoption, exploration and possible rejection11.
A platform for data management across multiple stake-holders (and digital twinning): The term ‘digital twins’
has roots in the cyber-physical systems community, but it can bemore broadly interpreted as Saddik (2018) “A digital
replica of a living or non-living physical entity. By bridging the physical and the virtual world, data is transmitted
seamlessly allowing the virtual entity to exist simultaneously with the physical entity.” In that context, a diverse range
of applications, including healthmonitoring devices; IoT enabled ‘smart’ solutions across a spectrum of scale - smart
home, building, city; supply chains, can all be see as projecting a digital twin. Blockchain can serve as a real-time data
management framework to enable digital twinning for the whole lifecycle (from data acquisition to logging its access
providing provenance, integrity as well as accountability with audit trail and transparency).
A multi-stakeholder data sharing platform, which acts as a natural aggregator of data, and allows secure data
management (including, facilitating data owners sovereignity over said data) and thus enables both digital government
as well as non-governmental applications (this is termed as ‘Blockchain platform as a service’ in Lyons et al. (2018a))
can thus be seen as the holy grail for a blockchain in the government technolgy stack. Several governments, at city,
state, country as well as supra-national levels, have deployed, started developing or expressed interest in exploring the
provisioning of suchmulti/omni-purpose blockchains. Prominent examples include Dubai SmartDubai.ae (2016), State
of IllinoisMorris et al. (2018), Estonia e estonia.com (2008), Switzerland Swisscom (2018), Australia 12, and EU through
European Blockchain Partnership 13.
7https://e-estonia.com/solutions/healthcare/e-health-record/
8https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2018/12/what-are-the-use-cases-for-blockchain-tech-in-healthcare/
9https://www.synaptichealthalliance.com
10https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/stable-coin_crypto-bond-catapults-swiss-franc-onto-blockchain/44512880
11https://cointelegraph.com/news/state-issued-digital-currencies-the-countries-which-adopted-rejected-or-researched-the-concept
12https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/karenandrews/media-releases/advancing-australias-blockchain-industry
13https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/european-countries-join-blockchain-partnership
8 ANWITAMANDATTA
4 | CRITIQUE: STATE AND THE CHAIN
The embrace of blockchains in the government technology stack is in its nascence. Consequently, despite numerous
news articles, press releases and white papers, actual technical details regarding most of the initiatives are often sparse,
sometimes contradictory, or just absent from the public domain in these early days. Furthermore, design and decisions
may just not yet be finalized, and so things naturally change. While we have tried our best to filter out the latest relevant
and correct information, it is apt to note at this juncture that some of the points wemake heremay inadvertently be
somewhat off themark, or may become obsolete over time.
Just like we see diverse forms of economic systems in general, where core services for citizens (such as health
care, transportation, financial services, utilities) are provided in some instances by solely government agencies, in
others, by only private entities, in yet others, in private-public partnerships, and finally, also in forms where private and
government run entities both operate and compete in themarket; from the examples we have discussed above, we see
an echo of similar different formats in the government technology (GovTech) space in general, and for blockchains for
GovTech in particular.
For the rest of our discussions here, we focus on three aspects: (i) blockchain support for digital soverign currency,
(ii) blockchain as a platform for digital identity, and (iii) the nature of the underlying blockchain infrastructure. The
other specific use cases, such as registry services or repository for digital records, all in turn rely on the underlying
infrastructure and the identity service.
Digital sovereign currency: In Lyons et al. (2018a), the following argument is forwarded “Another important
building block, in our opinion, is having digital versions of national currencies on the blockchain, for example through
blockchain-based central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Making it possible for legal tender to become an integral part
of blockchain transactionswillmake it easier to reap the benefits of new technologies like smart contracts. On a systemic
level, CBDCs could bring thebenefits of decentralisation to inter-bankpayments and real-time gross settlement systems,
among other things”.
There are several cryptocurrency flavoured approaches to realize a digital soverign currency, Venezuela’s Petro
(now apparently defunct) andMarshall Islands’ ‘the Sovereign’ (which also is planned to comewith physical ‘banknotes’)
come tomind. While there is some level of enthusiasm about such digital soverign currencies (to be distinguisedwith the
non-state-backed cryptocurrencies), it is rather unnecessary and a tokenization based approach showcased in project
Ubin is a pragmatic solution to realize central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).
To quote The Monetary Authority of Singapore (2017): “the SGD-on-ledger is a specific use coupon that is issued
on a one-to-one basis in exchange for money. The coupons have a specific usage domain – in our case for the settlement
of interbank debts – but no value outside of this. One is able to cash out by exchanging the coupons back intomoney later
... SGD-on-ledger has three useful properties that make it suited to our prototype. First, unlike money in bank accounts,
we do not receive interest on the on ledger holdings. The absence of interest calculations reduces the complexity of
managing the payment system. Second, to ensure full redeem-ability of the SGD-on-ledger for money, each token is
fully backed by an equivalent amount of SGD held in custody. This means that the overall money supply is unaffected
by the issuance of the on ledger equivalents since there is no net increase in dollar claims on the central bank. Third,
SGD-on-ledger are limited use instruments and can be designedwith additional features to support the use case – such
as security features against misuse.”
The three highlighted properties from the project Ubin report emphasize the importance of responsibly using
blockchainwithout creating instability while solving actual pain points of digitial financial activities that exist with legacy
infrastructure: particularly that the processes are unnecessarily complex with respect to the functionalities provided,
making the solutions inefficient (slower and/or expensive). Such a tokenized approach also allows a natural integration
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of the currency with other workflows and functionalities that may be carried out over amulti/omni-purpose blockchain
platform.
Digital ID in a multi-stakeholder environment: Digital identity has been repeatedly emphasized as one of the
‘killer apps’ of government blockchains. For instance, to quoteMorris et al. (2018): “A citizen-centric digital identity
model based on distributed ledger technologies could be used to consolidate disparate data that currently exists
across multiple agencies and layers of government into a network centered around a citizen’s or business’ credentials,
licenses and identity attributes. It would enable citizens to view their public service identity via an identity app on
their smartphone and share relevant data with government to access public services.” A EuropeanUnion Blockchain
Observatory & Forum report Lyons et al. (2018a) likewise states “One of themost important requirements in building
a digital economy and society is viable digital identities for all participants, whether individuals, companies, public
agencies or, increasingly, machines and other autonomous agents. The need to be able to identify ourselves and others
is so important, in fact, that it is considered the essential prerequisite for most use cases.” Many other whitepapers
World Economic Forum (2016); The World Bank Group (2018); Australia Post (2016);Willars (2019) have likewise
elaborated the importance of digital identity in the recent years.
The Estonian blockchain at its core deals with digital identity e estonia.com (2008), and several of the proposed
government run blockchains aim to provide and utilize digital identity in somemanner. Yet, some of the world’s largest
digitalized identity systems are in fact not blockchain based. This includes EU’s electronic IDentification, Authentication
and trust Services (eIDAS 14), India’s Aadhaar 15 which is the world’s largest world’s largest biometric ID system
managed byUnique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) and China’s social credit system The Economist (2016).
So the performance at scale, or themulti-stakeholder usage scenarios in themselves do not neccessitate the use of a
blockchain. One argument for using blockchains is the notion of ‘self-sovereign digital identity’Willars (2019). In this (as
well as many other security benefits that are assumed and/or promisedwith blockchain, such asmore generally data
sovereignty, portability, privacy and security, integrity and audit trail), the nuances of how the underlying infrastructure
is actually designed, deployed and used determines whether the security guarantees are actually realized. It is too
early to comment on how ID2020.org (2014) or DIF (2017) technology stack evolves, but wewill thus discuss (below)
the specific model used in e estonia.com (2008). Overall, what is factual is that blockchain based distributed ledger
technology can be used to support digital identity. However, it is not a singular option to do so, nor are all the assumed
security guarantees inherent invariants.
The infrastructure behind a blockchain as a multi/omni-purpose platform: As recently as earlier this year, on 9
February 2019, the EuropeanMedicines Verification System (EMVS)16 was launched17. Such an application perfectly
fits a blockchain use case, given the scale andmulti-stakeholder nature of the system. It (to thebest of our understanding)
however does not use blockchain technologies. In any case, many large-scale multi-stakeholder systems in general exist
and operate meeting their design objectives. While technologically not singular, andmany other alternative realizations
are possible (as exemplified by deployed systems), one argument in favour of a blockchain is to expose it as a platform
or service, where new applications can be modularly integrated, rather than having to design and deploy different
systems from scratch for individual applications. Incidentally, since such systems are being built ground up, they are in a
position to avoid some of the problems faced bymany legacy systems, such as poorly structured, non-standardized data,
interoperability across systems (though blockchain interoperability is still an open research issue Lyons et al. (2018b);
Buterin (2016); Rutter (2017)) and the ability to migrate the data to/from another system. While these are not inherent
14https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/trust-services-and-eid
15https://uidai.gov.in/my-aadhaar/about-your-aadhaar.html
16https://emvo-medicines.eu/mission/emvs/
17https://emvo-medicines.eu/new/wp-content/uploads/EMVO-Press-Release-EMVS-Launch.pdf
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properties of blockchain, the creation of a new digital infrastructure provides a coincidental opportunity.
In Lyons et al. (2018b,a), some design dilemmas are discussed at length. For instance, a top-down approachwhere
the government deploys (and possibly enforces) the usage of a single blockchain for every government related purpose,
will helpwith the aforementioned standardization by default, and yet, it may lead to a single vendor lock-in, while lacking
the flexibility to accommodate all possible use cases. Many of the national blockchain initiatives SmartDubai.ae (2016);
Swisscom (2018); e estonia.com (2008) appear to be following this approach of a single standardized blockchain. In con-
trast, uncoordinated experimentations of different technologies by different agencies may lead to duplication of effort,
as well as fragmentation of platforms. In Lyons et al. (2018a) amiddle ground is advocated: “flexible, cloud-based shared
infrastructure that hosts different protocols as well as developer tools, and an integrated development and operations
environment”. The authors further add “A shared “sandbox” approach, even one featuring multiple technologies, should
also foster knowledge sharing andmake it easier for agencies to work together to ensure interoperability”. Particularly
for a supra-national set-up such as the EU, this approachmay be inevitable, since individual member states would likely
embrace a spectrum of blockchain solutions.
While the above design dilemmas are relevant, in this paper, wewant to highlight a few other, arguablymore critical
issues, that needs careful attention.
Consider the KSI blockchain (used in e estonia.com (2008)), quoting Guardtime (2015) regarding data privacy
guarantees: “KSI does not ingest any customer data; data never leaves the customer premises. Instead the system
is based on one-way cryptographic hash functions that result in hash values uniquely representing the data, but are
irreversible such that one cannot start with the hash value and reconstruct the data - data privacy is guaranteed at all
times.”. Since the blockchain does not store the actual data, prima facie data privacy is achieved using the blockchain,
while also validating data integrity. However, depending on the nature of the data/application - if it is something that
resides on an off-chain storage repository and is corrupted, the blockchainwould be able to detect such corruption upon
usage of said off-chain data, but it does not support prevention or correction (for which, out of chain mechanisms would
be required in a well designed system). Likewise, the confidentiality of such datamay still be violated if the off-chain
repository is breached. For the electronic voting system i-Voting, e estonia.com (2008) states: “the Estonian solution is
simple, elegant and secure. During a designated pre-voting period, the voter logs onto the system using an ID-card or
Mobile-ID, and casts a ballot. The voter’s identity is removed from the ballot before it reaches the National Electoral
Commission for counting, thereby ensuring anonymity. With anymethod of remote voting, including traditional postal
ballots, the possibility of votes being forced or bought is a concern. Estonia’s solution was to allow voters to log on
and vote as many times as they want during the pre-voting period. Since each vote cancels the last, a voter always has
the option of changing his or her vote later.” However such broad and strong claim of security calls for skepticism. For
instance, side-information such as time of authentication/communication might reveal who a specific person voted
for, even if that information is not explicitly stored. We are not asserting that the Estonian blockchain deployment in
their e-Government technology stack necessarily suffers from all these vulnerabilities, and in fact, it is very likely that
some these concerns have been looked into andmany further layers of protection have been deployed. The purpose
of this discussion using hypotheticals is to emphasize that the blockchain does not and cannot provide a range of
security guarantees in a stand-alonemanner, yet we often see amarketing pitch in the lines of ‘its secure because it is a
blockchain’.
In e estonia.com (2008) it is further stated: “With KSI Blockchain deployed in Estonian government networks,
history cannot be rewritten by anybody and the authenticity of the electronic data can bemathematically proven. It
means that no-one – not hackers, not system administrators, and not even government itself – canmanipulate the data
and get awaywith that.”
However, generally speaking the claim that data is immutable because it is on a blockchain (which is the one
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fundamental functionality a blockchain is supposed to provide) may overlook some fundamental issues. In the specific
case of e estonia.com (2008), the blockchain is further published in the physical media (news papers), which are
subscribed bymany libraries spreadworldwide, creating a globally dispersed physical backupwhich is nigh to impossible
to tamper.
Public blockchains are hugely inefficient for the purposes of e-Government use cases. From usability and cost
perspectives, the sole rational choice is to use permissioned (and even private) blockchains. For instance, Swisscom
(2018) states “Swiss Post and Swisscom are connecting their existing private infrastructures for blockchain applications.
On the basis of distributed ledger technology, the two instances check each other and thus help to establish trust.
In contrast to "public blockchains" (e.g. Bitcoin and Ethereum), this private blockchain infrastructure requires much
less energy, since it can only be used by identified users who have a contractual relationship with the providers of an
application. This enables more efficient agreement procedures as well as significantly higher security and performance.
This is an important prerequisite for many companies to launch their own applications based on blockchain technology.”
The participating entities in such permissioned or private blockchains can collude together, or may be forced by a
(hypothetical, dystopian) government, tomanipulate the data. Furthermore, in many such deployments, the software
running at all sites are sourced from the same vendor. So a software (update) run by all the sites from amalicious or
compromised vendor would be sufficient to subvert the whole blockchain’s integrity. These are some very critical issues
that needmore attention, particularly in the context of blockchain use in the governemnt technology stack. An approach
like e estonia.com (2008) utilizing off-chain globally dispersed physical back-up is a nifty safeguard.
Finally, to wrap up, wewant to note that smart contracts can be used over a ‘Blockchain platform as a service’ to
automate many tasks, including, near real time monitoring and actuation of action plans, and in the longer term, to
enhance workflows and decision processes further driven by analytics (artificial intelligence). Such automation can
significantly improve the cost effectiveness and quality of service that can be delivered. However, the opportunities
to leverage such data using the blockchain infrastrucutre directly may also be constrained, depending on the nature
of the blockchain deployment. For example, if the actual data is stored off-chain, and tokenization is used, then the
nature of tokenization would influence the versatility of applications that can be built on top of the blockchain. This
in itself is not necessarily a bad thing, nor does it add fundamental limitations in creating decentralized applications
leveraging the troika of blockchains, smart contracts and artificial intelligence. In Lopez et al. (2019), an argument for (a
network of) blockchains being utilized as a glue to bind actual data and services that are off the chain (to realize better
data soverignity), and likewise keeping the logic also at the edge (which is where the data originates and/or is utilized) is
forwarded.
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